In the introduction, I situate enchantment as a key concept for engaging with a wide range of conversations both within and outside religious studies scholarship including: descriptions of modernity; accounts of secularization; conflicts between science and religion; differences between pre-modern and modern religious forms; comparisons between pre-modern and modern societies and religious expressions, new materialisms, immanent justifications for environmentalism, and arguments concerning the place of religious justifications in legal proceedings.

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the disenchantment thesis. Popularized by Max Weber a century ago and developed more recently by Marcel Gauchet, Charles Taylor, and others, the disenchantment thesis argues that specific modern developments have caused irreversible intellectual and affective changes such that modern individuals prefer scientific explanations over magical ones and are increasingly immune to feelings of fullness, mystery, and awe. Using the disenchantment thesis as a reference point, I also present a brief account of the kinds of pre-modern enchantments that are presumed to have existed prior to the alleged disenchantment of the world.

In this chapter, I present an overview of several recent arguments against the disenchantment thesis. I question the historical bases for claims that pre-modernity was in fact enchanted, discuss the continued global prevalence of religious belief and affiliation, and consider sociological evidence that points to the continued relevance and popularity of supernatural beliefs and practices such as belief in ghosts and spirits, the popularity of astrology, and the prevalence of contemporary magical thinking.

In this chapter, I consider recent arguments that the discourse of disenchantment primarily serves to disparage or disqualify specific groups or segments of society including women, children, people of colour, members of the so-called developing world, and individuals who live in the rural areas. From this perspective, disenchantment is less a claim about historical processes than a marker of difference used to separate imagined rational, modern, and civilized persons from imagined irrational, backward and deluded others. I also argue that processes of disenchantment are both popular and satisfying precisely because they provide a feeling of intellectual superiority to anyone who questions the apparent superstitions or delusions of others.

In this chapter, I build on themes raised in chapter two and engage with recent scholarship that describes the contemporary world as re-enchanted. This version of re-enchantment largely accepts the disenchantment thesis but points to the growth of new religious movements (e.g. Scientology, Wicca), the resurgence of various forms of paganism (e.g. Druidism), and renewed interest in occult practices (e.g. tarot cards, spirit mediums) as evidence that the disenchantment of the world is reversible.

In this chapter, I engage with recent scholarship that distinguishes between re-enchantment as a return of magical beliefs and practices explored in chapter four and apparently secular enchantments. This version of re-enchantment considers the popularity of fantasy literature and films (e.g. Harry Potter), the enduring appeal of stage magic shows, and other sources of peak experiences (e.g. festivals such as Burning Man, a sense of wonder in natural settings) as evidence that although widespread belief in magic may have declined, attempts to enjoy the affective dimensions of enchantment (wonder, awe) remain prevalent in modern secular societies.

In the final chapter, I present my own theoretical interventions in the study of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment. First, I argue that rather than viewing enchantment/re-enchantment and disenchantment in terms of an either/or binary, it is more fruitful to consider enchantment as a spectrum. In this view, individuals are never either fully enchanted or disenchanted but instead engage with or reject ‘magical’ beliefs and practices depending on the particular circumstances in they find themselves. Second, I argue that whether or not the disenchantment thesis provides and accurate account of historical developments, the discourse of disenchantment sets limits on the kinds of beliefs and practices individuals are willing to publicly admit entertaining. According to this view, ironic engagement with magical practices constitutes a valid form of modern enchantment. Finally, I argue that considering engagement with magical beliefs and practices through the lens of a playful, subjunctive ‘what if’ attitude creates a theoretical space in which to consider individuals who may deny the efficacy of magical beliefs and practices while nevertheless playfully engaging with these.

In the conclusion, I argue that recent attempts to ‘reclaim’ enchantment and to free the concept from its associations with magical thinking and delusion are largely misguided. Instead, I argue that related terms (awe, wonder) could easily replace enchantment and insist the concept’s dual nature (both magical thinking and delight) is precisely what makes it such a useful concept for understanding the forms of contemporary belief and practice explored in the final chapter.